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Abstract 
Household in developing countries use a variety of informal and formal mechanisms to cope 
with risk, including mutual support and public social security program. The present study 
addresses the issue of the relationship between social network and social protection both 
formal and informal. Using dataset of Cameroon’s survey on employment and informal sector 
(EESI2, 2005) and after controlling for the endogeneity of social network, our results suggest 
two main facts. First, while the relationship between social network and formal social 
protection is not significant, there is a strong and positive effect of social network on informal 
social protection. Second, formal social protection and informal social protection are 
substitute in Cameroon. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the relationship between social network, formal social protection and 
informal social protection in Cameroon. Using dataset of Cameroon’s survey on employment 
and informal sector (EESI3, 2005) and after controlling for the endogeneity of social network, 
our results suggest two main facts. First, while the relationship between social network and 
formal social protection is not significant, there is a strong and positive effect of social 
network on informal social protection. Second, formal social protection and informal social 
protection are substitute in Cameroon. 
There is a growing recognition that social protection is an essential component of an effective 
development strategy (Fouarge, 2003; Barrett et al, 2008). Indeed, as demonstrated by Barrett 
et al (2008), there are potentially large returns of social protection policies that stake out a 
productive safety net below the vulnerable and keep them from slipping into poverty trap. 
However, while most of the households in low income countries are exposed to a variety of 
risks and external shocks (illness, disability, death, unemployment, crop failure and natural 
catastrophe), few of them are able to prevent and mitigate risks. They are therefore less able 
to cope with the consequences of shocks (Churchill, 2006). In this vein, social protection, 
both formal and informal is essential to prevent people from failing into poverty trap (Jacquier 
et al, 2006). Unfortunately in most of low income countries, Cameroon to be specific, few 
peoples are covered by the formal social protection skim and have to depend largely on 
informal social protection such as household transfers and micro self insurance. In the specific 
case of Cameroon, the empirical evidence suggest that less than 18% of labor force have 
access to formal social protection and most of them (90.5%) are working in the informal 
sector (EESI, 2005). 
While the issue of social protection is at the heart of an increasing body of literature in 
economic and social science (Dercon and Krishnan, 2003; Duflo, 2003;Calvo and Romero, 
2009; Asher, 2010), little attention has been devoted to the relationship between social 
network and both formal and informal social protection. Moreover, the possible substitution 
between formal social protection and informal social protection is less clear. In this respect, 
the main contribution of this paper is twofold. First this paper addresses the issue of the effect 
of social network on both formal and informal social protection in Cameroon. Second, the 
paper addresses the question of substitutability between formal social protection and informal 
social protection in Cameroon. Following these objectives, this paper is a first attempt to fill 
the gap observed in the literature. 
There are several mechanisms through which social network, formal social protection and 
informal social protection are related. Social network convey useful information in the job 
search process such that individuals with larger networks should experience a high job arrival 
rate (Granovetter, 1995, Montgomery, 1991, Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004, Patacchini 
and Zenou, 2008). In the specific case of Cameroon which is pervaded with informality to 
great extent, social network helps get a job in the formal sector. Since formal jobs are 
automatically covered by the formal social protection system, social network positively 
affects formal social protection. Moreover, formal jobs exhibit better remuneration than the 
informal one. Thus peoples who work on formal sector are more able to subscribe for a formal 
insurance. Besides, social network induces trust and a network of solidarities which force 
each member of the network to bring a support for the other one in case of shocks such as a 
decline in production and consumption, natural disaster, health and education concerns 
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(Narayan, 1999; Hoogeveen, 2001). Finally, as suggested by Alesina and Giuliano (2007), 
there is a possible substitution between formal and informal social protection due to the fact 
that individuals with strong family ties exhibit a preference to the informal social protection. 
This preference is justified by the fact that a system of formal social protection supposes a 
permanent increase of the taxes. This increase makes de facto less costly the resort to the 
informal social protection. In contrast, the individuals who have weak family ties exhibit a 
preference for the formal social protection skim. Indeed, they cannot count reasonably on the 
family support 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follow: Section 2 is devoted to the econometric 
model, description of variables and the presentation of estimation methods. Section 3 
discusses the results and section 4 concludes. 
2. ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
In this section, we present three models. The first model is devoted to the relationship 
between social network and formal social protection. In this model, we want to test the 
hypothesis that the resort to social network positively influences formal social protection in 
Cameroon. The second model is constructed to test the hypothesis according to which social 
network has a positive effect on informal social protection in Cameroon. The third model test 
whether formal social protection and informal social protection are substitutes or 
complements why controlling for the effect of social network. Later on, we present data 
sources and we discuss about identification strategy. 
2.1. An Econometric equation of the relationship between social network and formal 
social protection 
We specify the following equation: 
'
0 1i i i ifsp sn Xα α β ε= + + +                                                                              (1) 
Where fsp , sn  and ε represent respectively the binary variable of formal social protection 
which takes value 1 if the individual benefit for the public social protection skim and 0 
otherwise, a binary variable of social network which takes the value 1 if the individual use the 
social network while looking for a job and 0 otherwise, and the error term. X is the vector of 
control variables which contains all individual characteristics such as age, marital status, 
religion and education. The subscript i is the index of individuals. 
2.2. An Econometric equation of the relationship between social network and informal 
social protection 
We specify the following equation: 
'
0 1i i i iisp sn Xδ δ γ η= + + +                                                                                                  (2) 
 Where isp is the variable of informal social protection which is captured by the volume of 
transfers between households? The vector X is the vector of control variables as described 
above. The error term is represented by η . 
2.3. An Econometric equation of the relationship between formal social protection and 
informal social protection 
Is there substitutability or complementarity between formal social protection and informal 
social protection? The following model is specified in order to answer this question: 
'
0 1i i i i iisp fsp sn Xφ φ σ ψ τ= + + + +                                                                                    (3) 
In this equation X is the vector of individual characteristics as described in 2.1 and 2.2. The 
equation (3) tests the hypothesis according to which an increase in formal social protection 
prevalence reduces the volume of transfers between households. However, we also test the 
reverse causality. May be the better way to address this question is to run a simultaneous 
equations system. However, due to the structure of the variables of social protection, this is 
quite difficult. In fact isp is a left censored variable and it is suitable to use a Tobit model 
while fsp is a discrete binary variable and lead to the use of Probit model. 
2.4 Formal social protection, informal social protection and social network measures 
and data sources 
Formal social protection is a binary variable which takes value 1 when the individual benefit 
for the public social protection skim. Informal social protection is measured by the volume of 
transfers between households. This choice is mainly supported by the works of Dercon and 
Krishnan (2003), Calvo and Romero (2009). In fact one expect that the higher is volume of 
inter household transfers, higher is the probability of risk sharing. Social network is measured 
by a binary variable which takes the value 1 when the individual use friends and relatives 
while looking for a job and 0 otherwise. This variable is chosen for two main reasons. First, 
this variable reflects as well the mobilization of social network as the stock of relationships 
(Mouw, 2003). In fact, while it is possible to have a high density of social relations without 
making use of them, it is difficult to make use of the network of relations when your social 
network is empty. Second, this variable is the only social network variable available in our 
database.  The variables used in this study are drawn from EESI(2005) which is the Survey on 
Employment and Informal Sector in Cameroon. This survey has a national cover and has been 
realized with 8540 households, that is 14606 individuals.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of each variable used in the estimation. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Std-Dev Minimum Maximum 
Formal social protection 4888 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Informal social protection 13682 0.15 0.58 0 16 
Social Network 5556 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Age 8655 29.68 11.19 15 60 
Age squared 8655 1006.6 771.1 225 3600 
Married 14556 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Protestant 14560 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Primary education 14564 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Secondary technical education 13065 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Secondary general education 14564 0.29 0.45 0 1 
High education 14564 0.06 0.25 0 1 
Household size 14574 6.57 3.82 0 30 
Fathst 6365 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 
2.5. Identification Strategy and the endogeneity of social network 
An important issue of the econometric test is about the endogeneity of social network. Indeed, 
the study explicitly allows for the possibility that network are not chosen randomly, but rather 
that some characteristics such as unobserved preferences or unobserved group characteristics 
determine the use of social network. Besides, the reverse causality between social protection 
and social network can also lead to endogenous bias. Another issue with the social network 
measure is the concern of measurement error. This problem is common to survey data and 
may be explained by the fact that sometime the surveyed thinks that to admit using friends 
and relatives is like confessing that one has not the qualifications required for the job. For all 
the reasons cited above, we need strong and valid instrument in order to avoid inconsistent 
estimates. We use the size of household as an instrument of social network. The idea behind 
this choice is the following: most of household in sub-Saharan African countries is made off 
by a large number of members. This generates social interactions and a network of 
solidarities. As argued by Putnam (2000), the high-density living increases social capital and 
thus social interactions. This argument is in line with sociological literature (Fischer, 1982) 
which argues that people living in large areas have a good deal of choice in constructing their 
social network and can seek out others with similar values and lifestyle. Besides, living in a 
household with a large number of members does not only increase social interaction, but also 
allow each member to benefit for the social network of others. In the same vein, Fischer 
(1982) clearly states that most adults encounter peoples through their families. Using a survey 
on personal network in Toulouse (France), Grossetti (2005) shows that more than 42% of 
friends are found through family. Moreover, Brueckner and Largey (2006) show that social 
network is an increasing function of population density while Wahba and Zenou (2004) use 
the latter as a proxy of social network. At the level of household this result can hold in the 
sense that persons living in larger households have high alternatives for exchange within the 
household and are able to benefit for external support through the network of each member of 
the household. Besides, the size of the household is exogenous in most empirical analysis. 
Indeed even if the size of household may change over the time, this change is not easy 
predictable. 
On the methodological plan, we check whether the instrument chosen is weak or not. Indeed, 
if the instrument is weak, the coefficient of social network will be weakly identified and the 
estimates biased [(Dufour ( 1997; 2003), Staiger and Stock ( 1997), Doko and Dufour (2008)]. 
We run the weak instrument test proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). This test also confirms 
the rejection of the null hypothesis as far as the Cragg-Donald Wald test F statistics are 
sufficiently high and above the critical values (see table 2, 3 & 4 in appendix). 
3. RESULTS 
We present the results of the impact of social network on social protection. For each model, 
we compare OLS and the relevant specification (Probit in the case of formal social protection 
and Tobit in the case of informal social protection). 
3.1. The non significant impact of social network on informal social protection 
Table 2 in appendix presents the results of the equation (1). We compare OLS regressions 
(column 1), Probit regression (column 2) and instrumental variable Probit (column 4). As we 
can see, the results are quite robust to the estimation methods when we do not take into 
account the endogeneity of social network. In this case, the effect of social network on formal 
social protection is positive and significant. Talking about instrumental regression, the first 
stage of instrumental variable Probit show that our instrument is significantly correlated to the 
endogenous regressor. Moreover, the Cragg-Donald Wald Fstat shows that the instrument is 
not weak. However, the effect of social network on formal social protection is not significant 
after the correction of endogenous bias. Besides, we also notice that most of the explanatory 
variables have the correct sign. It is for instance the case of all education variables (primary, 
secondary and high education) that are positively correlated to formal social protection. 
Moreover there is a non linear relationship between formal social protection and age. 
3.2. The positive effect of social network on informal social protection 
The results of the estimation of the effect of social network on informal social protection are 
presented in table 3. Columns (1), (2) and (4) present respectively the OLS estimates, Tobit 
and Instrumental variable Tobit estimates. First, the results of OLS estimates differ from those 
of Tobit model in terms of magnitude and significance of coefficients. Second, the issue of 
endogeneity matters. Indeed, after correcting for endogenous bias, the effect of social network 
on informal social protection is positive and significant. This result is in line with those of  
Dercon and Krishnan (2003), Calvo and Romero (2009) who put a strong emphasis on the 
role of social network as a safety net against shocks. 
3.3. The inverse relationship between formal social protection and informal social 
protection 
Table 4 presents both the instrumental variable Probit and instrumental variable Tobit of the 
relationship between formal and informal social protection. Looking at column (1), one 
observes that the causal effect of informal social protection on formal social protection is 
significant and negative. In order to account for reverse causality, we also run a regression of 
the informal social protection on formal one using a Tobit model. The same inverse 
relationship is observed (see column 2). Summing up, there is an inverse relationship between 
formal social protection and informal social protection. This result confirms those obtained by 
Alesina and Giuliano (2007). Specifically, this result shows that both formal social protection 
and informal social protection are substitutes for each other.  
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While an increasing body of literature put a strong emphasis on the role of social network as 
safety net in order to cope with shocks, few papers have attempt to establish a relationship 
between social network and both formal and informal social protection. This paper is an 
attempt to fill this gap. 
Specifically, we address two main issues. First we analyze the effect of social network 
respectively on formal and informal social protection. Second, we address the issue of 
substitution between formal and informal social protection. Using dataset of Cameroonian 
survey on employment and informal sector (EESI, 2005), we provide three evidences. First, 
there is no significant effect of social network on formal social protection. Second, there is a 
positive and significant effect of social network on informal social protection. Finally, the 
obtained results show that formal social protection and informal social protection are 
substitutes in the specific case of Cameroon. 
The results drawn from this paper suggest that as far as the implementation of formal social 
protection is costly, all policies promoting informal social protection, notably through social 
capital improvement and the increase of inter households transfers are important in order to 
cope with shocks. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 2: Impact of social network on formal social protection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Probit  First Stage IV Probit 
Variables Formal social 
protection 
Formal social 
protection 
Social 
Network 
Formal social 
protection 
     
Social 
network 
0.0405*** 
         (0.0103) 
0.275*** 
(0.0643) 
 -1.395 
(1.187) 
Age 0.0112*** 0.113*** -0.0137*** 0.0842*** 
 (0.00250) (0.0199) (0.00482) (0.0292) 
Age squared -8.18e-05** -0.00104*** 5.98e-05 -0.000855*** 
 (3.69e-05) (0.000265) (6.68e-05) (0.000309) 
Married -0.0663*** -0.595*** -0.159*** -0.878*** 
 (0.00925) (0.0862) (0.0207) (0.226) 
Protestant 0.0186* 0.103 -0.00507 0.0797 
 (0.0109) (0.0630) (0.0183) (0.0713) 
Primary  0.0484*** 0.727*** 0.0144 0.759*** 
 (0.00887) (0.183) (0.0304) (0.186) 
Secondaryt 0.174*** 1.489*** 0.0105 1.565*** 
 (0.0160) (0.187) (0.0337) (0.195) 
Secondaryg 0.0931*** 1.120*** -0.00641 1.147*** 
 (0.0114) (0.188) (0.0317) (0.189) 
Highe 0.495*** 2.359*** -0.104*** 2.346*** 
 (0.0258) (0.190) (0.0343) (0.191) 
Household 
size 
  0.00503** 
(0.00233) 
 
     
Fathst 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
-0.269*** 
 
 
 
-4.997*** 
0.0310 
(0.0468) 
 
0.809*** 
 
 
 
-3.546*** 
 (0.0395) (0.395) (0.0855) (1.107) 
     
     
     
Observations 3917 3917 3171 3917 
R-squared 
Prob>F 
Prob>Chi2 
Cragg-Donald  
Wald F-stat 
0.227 
[0.000] 
 
 
[0.000] 
0.078  
 
[0.000] 
15.17 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Primary, 
secondary, secondary, highe and fathst are respectively primary education, secondary 
technical education, secondary general education, high education and a binary variable which 
takes value 1 if the father of the worker is senior executive and 0 otherwise. The Cragg-
Donald Wald F-statistics of weak identification test is compared to the Stock-Yogo weak ID 
test critical values [16.38 (10%); 8.96 (15%); 6.66 (20%); 5.53 (25%) 
 
Table 3: Impact of Social network on informal social protection 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Tobit First stage IV Tobit 
Variables Informal social 
protection 
Informal social 
protection 
Social 
network 
Informal social 
protection 
     
Social 
network 
-0.00566 0.00642  6.924*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0548)  (2.295) 
Age -0.0141** -0.0701*** -0.0160*** 0.0563 
 (0.00580) (0.0146) (0.00401) (0.0528) 
Age squared 0.000177** 0.000946*** 8.66e-05 0.000120 
 (7.78e-05) (0.000203) (5.50e-05) (0.000525) 
Married -0.0696*** -0.185*** -0.163*** 0.887** 
 (0.0146) (0.0686) (0.0174) (0.383) 
Protestant 0.0251 0.0391 0.000633 0.0373 
 (0.0211) (0.0565) (0.0155) (0.123) 
Primary -0.0339 0.0664 0.0230 -0.124 
 (0.0246) (0.0940) (0.0254) (0.208) 
Secondaryt 0.0152 0.212** 0.0436 -0.100 
 (0.0313) (0.105) (0.0286) (0.246) 
Secondaryg 0.000254 0.207** 0.0170 0.102 
 (0.0299) (0.0988) (0.0268) (0.213) 
Highe -0.0151 0.158 -0.0891*** 0.793** 
 (0.0394) (0.110) (0.0289) (0.312) 
Household size   0.00619***  
   (0.00195)  
Constant 0.399*** 0.0859 0.829*** -6.134*** 
 (0.103) (0.253) (0.0717) (2.128) 
     
Observations 4387 4387 4422 4387 
R-squared 
Prob>F 
Prob>Chi2 
Cragg-Donald 
Wald F-stat 
0.007 
[0.000] 
[0.000] 
 0.084 
[0.000] 
[0.000] 
 
 
 
11.34 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Primary, 
secondary, secondary, highe and fathst are respectively primary education, secondary 
technical education, secondary general education, high education. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-
statistics of weak identification test is compared to the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
values [16.38 (10%); 8.96 (15%); 6.66 (20%); 5.53 (25%)]. 
. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4: Relationship between formal social protection and informal social protection 
 (1) (2) 
 IV Probit IV Tobit 
Variables Formal social protection Informal social protection 
   
Social network -1.547 5.143*** 
 (1.145) (1.450) 
Informal social protection -0.210**  
 (0.0925)  
Formal social protection  -0.838*** 
  (0.223) 
Age 0.0751** 0.0418 
 (0.0294) (0.0382) 
Age squared -0.000758** 0.000139 
 (0.000314) (0.000410) 
Maried -0.908*** 0.665** 
 (0.220) (0.262) 
Protestant 0.0796 0.0997 
 (0.0721) (0.105) 
Primary 0.763*** -0.00439 
 (0.188) (0.159) 
Secondaryt 1.579*** 0.124 
 (0.197) (0.184) 
Secondaryg 1.157*** 0.203 
 (0.191) (0.169) 
Highe 2.349*** 0.557** 
 (0.193) (0.237) 
Constant -3.274*** -4.740*** 
 (1.082) (1.399) 
   
Observations 
Prob>Chi2 
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat 
3882 
[0.000] 
16.74 
3882 
[0.000] 
17.34 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Primary, 
secondary, secondary, highe are respectively primary education, secondary technical 
education, secondary general education, high education. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics 
of weak identification test is compared to the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values [16.38 
(10%); 8.96 (15%); 6.66 (20%); 5.53 (25%)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
